Volume 49

Issue 1

Article 9

December 1942

Contempt by Publication in West Virginia
G. W. E.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the First
Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
G. W. E., Contempt by Publication in West Virginia, 49 W. Va. L. Rev. (1942).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol49/iss1/9

This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

E.: Contempt by Publication in West Virginia

STUDENT NOTES
CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION IN WEST VIRGINIA
The power of the courts to deal swiftly and summarily with
offenders who interrupt the judicial processes has been subject to
much criticism. The extreme critics would deny the necessity for
the exercise of this ancient judicial prerogative even in the punishment of improper conduct in the presence of the court.' Clearly,
the decorum of the courtroom must be maintained without the
delay incident to the regular procedure of indictment and trial by
jury. The force of this argument has directed most of the adverse
comment to the use of the contempt power in the punishment of
acts done outside the courtY The protagonists of the summary
power to punish these distant offenses, which are called constructive contempts, base their arguments upon the necessity for an untrammelled flow of justice.3 Unalterably opposed to this view are
those who would call upon us to witness the arbitrary behavior of a
judge who is at once prosecutor, principal witness, trier of fact,
and tribunal. 4 They further insist that the natural resentment of
the judge whose reputation is attacked emphasizes the unfairness
of the proceedings.
Judicial assertion of the inherency of the contempt power is
most frequently assailed when it seems to infringe upon the freedom of the press. The contemnor who has been guilty of publishing a newspaper article attacking the integrity of the court sits
firmly upon his constitutional rights. An anomalous result emerges
from this controversy. The courts have in such cases indulged in
unusually careful analyses of the origin of their power. They
predicate their arguments upon the hypothetical conclusion that
I DANGEL,

CONTEMPT (1939) § 42A.
2 Fox, CONTEMPT OP COURT (1927)

226; Nelles and King, Contempt by
Publication in the United States (1928) 28 CoL. L. REv. 401.
3 Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Mass 294, 52 N. E. 445
(1899); Bridges v. California, 62 S. Ct. 190 (U. S. 1941), Frankfurter, T.,
dissenting at page 201.
4DANGEL, CONTEMPT § 42A; Nelles and King, supra note 2, at page 406
state the following criticism: "But though the popular reaction (against the
Sedition Acts) implied an enlarged view of constitutional immunity for publications, it could not formulate its precise boundaries. They were left, and still
remain, vague. Subsequent judicial decisions have established no test of the
permissible limits of American freedom of the press which may not vary with
the length of feet of the triers of fact."
5 Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821); Toledo Newspaper Co. v.
United States, 247 U. S. 402, 38 S. Ct. 560, 62 L. Ed. 1186 (1918); Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 260 Mass. 369, 157 N. E. 693 (1927).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1942

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1942], Art. 9

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

such power sprang into being coeval with their creation. This
claim, though now firmly established judicially, has been proved to
be historically incorrect.8 This writer pays due respect to the extensive research which has unearthed such information, but believes it practical to accept the self-evident fact that the American
courts have consistently exercised this power. This brief introduction of the fundamental aspects of such a long-standing controversy seems necessary to a better understanding of the reaction
of the West Virginia court to the problem.
The question of summary punishment for publication of a
newspaper article libeling the court appeared in West Virginia for
the first time in the case of State v. Frew and Hart.7 The defendant
had written statements which were libelous per se. Three judges
of the supreme court of appeals were accused of having told a
Democratic caucus that they would hold an exemption tax statute
unconstitutional and sustain a certain assessment order. The
article was published during the pendency of the tax case in
the supreme court of appeals; it was obviously intended to influence the outcome of the litigation by placing the judges in a
compromising and embarassing position. Doubtless the defendant
reasoned that the court would be forced to make the decision he
favored in order to vindicate its integrity. The court immediately
issued a rule against him, ordering him to show cause why an
attachment for contempt should not issue. The defendant insisted
that the power of the court to punish summarily for constructive
contempt had been cut off by statute. As the proceedings originated
in the supreme court of appeals, it was necessary to decide whether
these legislative limitations applied to the highest court of the
state.
One section of the West Virginia code states:" "The courts
and the judges thereof may issue attachments for contempt and
punish them summarily only in the following cases:...", and lists
four types of offenses commonly intrepreted by the judiciary as
direct contempts. 9 Obviously the legislature intended to limit the
cFox,

CoNTEXPT op COURT c.II.
724 W. Va. 416 (1884).
s W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 5, § 26. This statute, and e. 61, art.
5, § 27 of the Code are substantial counterparts of c. 147, §§ 27, 28, 29 and 30
of W. VA. CODE (1868).
0 By W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 5, § 26, these offenses are punishable summarily: "(a) Iisbehavior in the presence of the court, or so near
thereto as to obstruct or interrupt the administration of justice; (b) violence
or threats of violence to a judge or officer of the court, or to a juror, witness,
or party going to, attending or returning from the court, for or in respect of
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exercise of the summary power of punishment to the situations
described in the statute. An analysis of the second section dealing
with the subject of offenses against the court proves such intent.
It reads as follows :10
"If any person by threats, force, or otherwise, intimidate or
impede, or attempt to intimidate or impede, any judge, justice
of the peace, juror, witness, arbitrator, umpire, or an officer
or member of any court in the discharge of his duty as such,
or by any means obstruct or impede, or attempt to obstruct or
impede, the administration of justice in any court, he shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, unless
otherwise provided by law, he shall be fined... , and be imprisoned . . ."
The import of the broad language employed here is clearly the
inclusion of the offenses purposely left out of the previous section.
All constructive contempts are to be punished by the regular procedure of trial by jury.
The Constitution of West Virginia, as amended in 1879, prescribed the organization and jurisdiction of the supreme court of
appeals and of the circuit courts of the state." It is generally said
that courts created by constitutional provision have inherent power
to punish for contempt, independent of any statute attempting to
confer that power.'
Conversely, any statute proscribing the exercise of the contempt power would seem to be ineffectual and liable
to attack upon constitutional grounds. 3
The court in the Prew case, after a lengthy opinion reviewing
the decisions of other states and discussing the origin of our statutes,
stated its position :14
"That statute . . . might be considered constitutional now as
to the circuit court, for ... it might be deemed a mere regulation of the power of courts to punish as for contempt, as it
leaves power to the circuit courts by indictments under their
own supervision to punish as for constructive contempts of
the character which we are considering. Whether such power
any act or proceeding had, or to be had, in such court; (c) misbehavior of an
officer of the court, in his official character; (d) disobedience to or resistance
of any officer of the court, juror, witness, or other person, to any lawful process, judgment, decree or order of the said court."
1o W. VA. CoDE (Michie, 1937) c. 61, art. 5, § 27.
11 W. Va. CoNST. art. VIII.
12 State v. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057 (1908); People v. Gilbert,
281 IlN. 619, 118 N. E. 196 (1917); Carter v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 791, 32
S. E. 780 (1899).
13 State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1855).
14 24 W. Va. 416, at 464.
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under the Code is sufficient for the protection of said courts,
we will not now determine. .
Neither is it necessary to decide whether the Legislature can limit the power of this Court
to punish for constructive contempts, as it is evident to us it
has not attempted to do so ... The whole scope of the statute
shows clearly that it is intended to apply to inferior courts and
not to the Supreme Court of Appeals... This Court then has
the unrestricted power, uncontrolled and unregulated by
statute to punish for direct or constructive contempt by fine
or imprisonment or both."
The court laid aside the constitutional question by the simple
expedient of holding that the legislature disclaimed any intention
of regulating the supreme court of appeals by providing for the
impanelment of a jury to ascertain the proper punishment in certain instances. The supreme court has no machinery to carry out
this particular requirement of the statute because it cannot impanel a jury.
In view of the statements in the Frew case regarding the
soundness of the statute as applied to the circuit courts, it is hardly
-urprising to find its constitutionality affirmed in the later case of
State v. McClaugherty."' There proceedings were started in a circuit court on facts similar to those in the Frew case. At the
supreme court hearing on an appeal by the defendant, the state
argued that the sanction of legislative power to limit and regulate
the procedure in the punishment of contemnors allows that body
to wipe out jurisdiction altogether and render the court useless.
The court, by way of answer to that contention, upheld the statute
as a regulation of proceedings rather than a limitation of the
jurisdiction of courts in contempt eases. Subsequent decisions have
affirmed the validity of the statutory limitation upon proceedings
originating in the circuit courts. 6
From a procedural viewpoint, the argument of the court in the
McClaugherty case is sound. The effect of the two statutes upon
the circuit courts is not the limitation of jurisdiction over such
offenses. It simply forbids the use of the summary remedy as an
efficient alternative to the more cumbersome process of indictment
and jury trial. It is arguable that the reason for preserving the
summary power in the supreme court of appeals applies with
equal force to the circuit courts. If the power is based on the
15 33 W. Va. 250, 10 S. E. 407. (1889).
16 State v. Ralphsnyder, 34 W. Va. 352, 12 S.E. 721 (1890) ; State v. Hans-

ford, 43 W. Va. 773, 28 S. E.791 (1897) ; State v. Porter, 105 W. Va. 441, 143
S. B. 93 (1928).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol49/iss1/9

4

E.: Contempt by Publication in West Virginia
STUDENT NOTES
inherent right of constitutional courts, grounded in the necessity
of maintaining dignified and orderly judicial procedure, the circuit courts have a valid claim to this weapon. The danger of
malicious attacks on the integrity of the courts, and of premature
discussion of the rights of litigants, is a real one. If the court may
not invoke the summary power to prevent the contennor from
making further attacks while the case is pending, the damage will
be complete before the offender is brought to trial. The contempt
power is a wise preventive measure which the courts have for the
most part used with restraint for the protection of litigants. There
seems to be little feasibility in a legislative denial of its use by the
circuit courts, especially in view of the constitutional protection
against statutory limitation which is afforded the supreme court of
appeals.
G. W. E.

UNITY PLAN IN DEDICATION OF WAYS
The recent case of Huddleston v. Deans gives rise to a problem
over which there is a wide divergence of opinion, namely, the legal
proposition known as the "unity plan"." It has been defined as
a sale of lots with reference to a plat or map delineating streets and
alleys whereby the purchazers acquire a right in all the ways designated thereon.'
Generally it may be said that West Virginia
has adopted the unity plan.F Other jurisdictions limit the rights
of the purchaser to those streets and alleys affording the lot owner
necessary ingress and egress to his property.4 New York extends
the right to those streets on which the lot owner's property abuts
only as far as the first cross-street in each direction.5 Massachusetts
is even more stringent.8
'21 S. E. (2d) 352 (W. Va. 1942).

22 THOMPsON, REAL PRopEaTy (Penn. ed.
RoADS (4th ed. 1926) 157.

1940) 38; 1 ELioTT,

STREETS &
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In Rudolph v. Glendale Improvement Co., 103 W. Va. 81, 87, 137 S.E. 349
(1927), the court said, "there are strong expressions in .. [Cook v. Totten,
49 W. Va. 177, 38 S. E. 491 (1901) and Edwards v. Moundsville Land Co., 56
W. Va. 43, 48 S. E. 754 (1904)] which would favor the unity rule if a case
solely presenting that question . . .was to be decided. The great weight of
authority sustains the unity rule; and the reasons for its adoption are very
persuasive."
4State v. Hamilton, 109 Tenn. 276, 70 S. W. 619 (1902); Bell v. Todd, 51
Mich. 21, 16 N. W. 304 (1883).
5Reis v. City of New York, 188 N. Y. 58, 80 N. E. 573 (1907).
6See Regan v. Boston Gas & Light Co., 137 Mass. 37 (1884).
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